A new route to democracy in Venezuela

BNamericas speaks to Julia Buxton, a Latin America political specialist and professor at the University of Manchester, about the likely impact of Joe Biden's presidential election victory on US-Venezuela relations. Buxton, the author of The Failure of Political Reform in Venezuela, believes Biden will differ from predecessor Donald Trump by taking a multilateral approach to the South American country's political discord.

BNamericas: Will Joe Biden seek a coordinated effort to oust Nicolás Maduro rather than the unilateral approach favored by Donald Trump? With whom would the Biden administration seek to collaborate to achieve this goal? And what type of joint action could be taken? 

Buxton: A multilateral approach to Venezuela's protracted political conflict and grave humanitarian situation is necessary and hoped for. The challenge is that actors such as the OAS [Organization of American States], the Lima Group and certainly Colombia have been discredited by their close association with the failed unilateralism of the Trump presidency. The EU has the potential to be an important partner for the US, building on the work of the International Contact Group. 

However, I expect that the Venezuela ‘issue’ will be indirectly addressed through Biden’s pursuit of more constructive relations with China and Russia. There will be no ‘exit’ strategy for Venezuela without the engagement of these two countries and there is some optimism that an incoming Biden administration will work through China and Russia as interlocutors. 

The priority for Biden should be focusing on the most egregious impacts of US strategy on Venezuela – primarily sanctions and approval of temporary immigration status. The hemisphere, and Venezuela, will benefit greatly if Biden addresses the grave damage caused by US unilateralism and assumes more of a backseat.

BNamericas: Do you think Biden will recognize Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's legitimate leader or will he seek direct dialogue with Maduro? 

Buxton: Guaidó is a busted flush and Biden needs an arms-length approach from the outset if his administration is not to be similarly overwhelmed as Trump was by noisy, fractious Venezuelan opposition group lobbies. Guaidó’s interim presidency has been personification of the two decades of mistakes by the center-right opposition: too much energy spent courting international support to the detriment of building a domestic base; disconnect from local concerns, and absence of any meaningful oversight or accountability. 

The constitutional ruse of the ‘interim’ presidency to displace Maduro has failed. It was based on poor intelligence and expectations of political change capacity that were not based on fact. It is time to move on and look to a different approach – one that broadens out stakeholders consulted on Venezuela strategy, ends the capture of US-Venezuela policy by a politically well-connected minority, and which puts professionalism, diplomacy and a new state department front and center of strategy. 

There are multiple other political voices in Venezuela, and rather than persisting with a binary Guaidó or Maduro, a Biden administration would serve Venezuela well by at least understanding and encouraging that pluralism. Biden’s decision to recognize Guaidó or not is complicated by Venezuela’s national assembly elections in December. 

Guaidó’s non-participation in the contest will cause serious diplomatic difficulties for those countries that recognise him as the legitimate head of state. At the same time, his abstention provides an opportunity for the US to reset relations and better engage with the diversity of opposition groups in Venezuela, and the Maduro government itself. 

BNamericas: Some commentators have suggested that the US will lift oil sanctions against Venezuela to alleviate the suffering of its people. Would this not play into Maduro's hands by financing his regime and allowing officials to continue misusing PDVSA profits for their own personal gain? 

Buxton: US oil sanctions have played into Maduro’s hands. They have been cruel and ineffective. As in Cuba, Iran and other country contexts, US sanctions have simply transferred the suffering to ordinary people rather than officials. In the case of Venezuela, the sanctions have dramatically increased the costs of the country’s reconstruction and they will cause permanent damage to oil production capacity. 

Lifting the sanctions on the basis of current levels of Venezuelan oil production, which was 383,000b/d in September 2020 – well below the 700,000b/d for the same period 2019 – will not amount to a flood of revenue, but it is an important source of monies to address immense social suffering. There are mechanisms that have and can be used to prevent nefarious regimes – both interim and incumbent – from pilfering public funds and export revenues. 

These can be bureaucratic and cumbersome, but they do shift the burden of suffering away from vulnerable people. The easiest forms are international trust funds or UN administration. Some sections of the opposition have already developed credible proposals for a third party-administered national oil trust and this merits serious consideration.  

BNamericas: What is a realistic objective for Biden in regard to a timeframe for a return to democracy in Venezuela? Will he accept that Maduro will remain in power until at least 2024?  

Buxton: Biden’s focus should be on the conditions of democracy in the US itself. This begins with, among other things, rebuilding a credible and professional State Department rather than relying on noisy and aggressive high-level individuals as the flagbearers of foreign policy, as we saw with [Mike] Pompeo, Elliott Abrams and John Bolton. 

Biden’s priority should be engaging in hemispheric efforts to address the Venezuelan migrant and humanitarian crisis in a coherent and coordinated fashion, and to understand that as difficult and challenging as it is, there will be no progress without meaningful dialogue with the Maduro government and other important international actors including Russia, China and Cuba. 

Whether Biden accepts or not that Maduro will be in power until 2024 is irrelevant. Obama and Trump did not accept that Maduro would remain in power but he has outlasted both. The issue is not big meta questions of who is or who is not in power. The most immediate issue a Biden administration must address is how US sanctions are contributing to suffering and what mechanisms enable the US to better address these harms at a micro rather than macro and regime change level.   

BNamericas: What will Biden do differently to Trump in 2018 to ensure Venezuela's next presidential election is free and transparent? And, perhaps more importantly, can you see Maduro ceding to demands to allow international observers and lift bans on political opponents?

Buxton: I think if we have learned anything over the last week, it is that the credibility of the US to dictate to other countries the quality, legitimacy and architecture of sovereign political systems is seriously damaged. At a time when some of us are wondering if international sanctions should similarly be imposed on US officials blocking democratic change, it seems wildly optimistic to suggest to Venezuela – or other countries around the world – that they should take instruction from the US on transparent and credible election processes or international election observation. 

The risk is that the Trump experience will be anomalyzed, with an incoming Biden administration allowing this traumatic week to be written off as an aberration. The reality is the US has deep structural problems with its political and electoral system. This will remain at the forefront of judgements of US foreign policy going forward. Such levels of US interference and judgement of politics and electoral processes in third countries was never widely accepted as credible or legitimate in the first place. That is why Nicolás Maduro is still in power.