Venezuela on the precipice

Most commentators regard the result of the non-binding referendum held in Venezuela on July 16 as a massive slap in the face for President Nicolás Maduro.

Over 7mn Venezuelans turned out to vote – around 10% of them living abroad – and nearly 100% of those rejected Maduro's plans to set up a so-called constituent assembly – elections for which are due to be held July 30 – to draw up a new constitution. They also voted in favor of two other more controversial questions calling on the armed forces to defend the current opposition-dominated national assembly and demanding elections and the formation of an apparently parallel national unity government. 

However, who the winners and losers were in the plebiscite is not so clear cut. The 7mn or so who voted represent less than 40% of Venezuela's electorate of 19.5mn, and of course only opponents of Maduro were likely to cast their ballot. In other words, we know the size of the opposition vote but we don't know the size of the pro-government vote (although the number of votes in favor was slightly lower than the opposition showing in the 2015 congressional elections and the 2013 presidential election that confirmed Maduro in power). What that means is that Maduro can claim most people are in favor of (or at least not opposed to) the constituent assembly process. 

And while it's very unlikely that Maduro has the support of the majority of those who didn't vote (according to notoriously unreliable opinion polls, he has less than 20% backing), even if his approval ratings are abysmal that per se is no reason – despite what the secretary general of the Organization of American States, Luis Almagro, and many others inside and outside Venezuela have argued – to call a fresh presidential election right now. According to that logic, the vast majority of Latin American presidents would be out the door tomorrow.

The important thing is that the government respects the current constitution, calls the delayed regional elections and holds presidential elections as programmed next year. As for constituent assemblies, even in a seriously flawed democracy as is the case of Venezuela, they require prior approval of congress, as would be the case in Chile if the government ever gets around to enacting its plans for a new constitution. Obviously, in Venezuela that isn't going to happen as Maduro is riding roughshod over the legislature, which he would clearly like to abolish (as his cronies in the supreme court already tried to effectively do once).

The result is a constitutional crisis with no obvious solution. A coup is neither probable, given the armed forces' support for Maduro, nor desirable. Sanctions, particularly those that Donald Trump has threatened to impose, are only likely to make matters worse. An oil import embargo – Venezuela exports about 700,000 barrels a day to the US – would hurt already-suffering ordinary Venezuelans and push the dire petrodollar-dependent economy to breaking point. Maduro, meanwhile, would be able to blame the economic collapse on US imperialism.

Despite all the demonstrations, which have left over 100 people dead, neither the opposition nor external factors such as the OAS are likely to sway him. Pressure from within his own ranks and allies is probably the only thing that will lead Maduro to see sense, and recent signs of splits in chavismo, such as the criticism voiced by attorney general Luisa Ortega, may be an indication of things to come. Once he's persuaded that he's wrecking the legacy of his hero and mentor Hugo Chávez, he may show some flexibility and hopefully take the road to reconciliation.